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guishing claims of conscience 
from other types of claims. Cer-
tainly, if abortion providers’ 
conscience-based claims require 
scrutiny, so do conscience-based 
refusals, to ensure that refusals 
are indeed motivated by conscience 
and not by political beliefs, stigma, 
habit, erroneous understanding of 
medical evidence, or other factors.
Despite nearly four decades of 
debate about conscientious refus-
als, we have no clear path for op-
erationalizing them — no stan-
dard curriculum to teach health 
care professionals how to hu-
manely conscientiously object, and 
no clinical standard of care for 
conscientious refusals — although 
there are presumably good and 
bad, skillful and haphazard, safe 
and unsafe ways of carrying 
them out. Since we need both a 
standard curriculum and a stan-
dard of care, it is perhaps prema-
ture to introduce a whole new set 
of conscience claims. The terms 
used in the current debate, how-
ever, are inadequate and inac-
curate.
Recognizing only negative 
claims of conscience with respect 
to abortion — or any care — is a 
kind of hemineglect. Health care 
workers with conflicting views 
about contested medical proce-
dures might all be “conscientious,” 
even though their core beliefs 
vary. Failure to recognize that 
conscience compels abortion pro-
vision, just as it compels refusals 
to offer abortion care, renders 
“conscience” an empty concept 
and leaves us all with no moral 
ground (high or low) on which 
to stand.
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The Supreme Court and the Future of Medicaid
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, J.D., and Sara Rosenbaum, J.D.
Perhaps the biggest of the many surprises found in the 
Supreme Court’s June 28 deci-
sion on the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) was the Court’s conclusion 
that the law’s Medicaid expan-
sion scheduled for 2014 was un-
constitutional.1 Attention before 
June 28 was focused on whether 
the Court would uphold the indi-
vidual mandate to obtain health 
insurance coverage, but in the 
wake of the Court’s decision, fo-
cus has shifted to the question of 
whether states will refuse to par-
ticipate in expanding the Medic-
aid program, given the Court’s 
holding that the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services 
cannot enforce the expansion as a 
mandate.
Sommers et al. now provide in 
the Journal (pages 1025–1034) a 
glimpse of the impact of Medic-
aid expansion in New York, Maine, 
and Arizona. Medicaid expansion 
in these states was associated not 
only with improved health care 
coverage but also with reduced 
mortality. The question of whether 
the states will expand Medicaid, 
therefore, is not just a question of 
politics; it is a question of life, 
health, and death.
The expansion is one of several 
important Medicaid changes in 
the ACA. But as Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg noted in her opinion, 
changes in Medicaid are not new. 
Medicaid itself was established in 
1965 as an amendment to the pre-
existing Medical Assistance for the 
Aged program. Since then, Con-
gress has amended Medicaid at 
least 50 times, mandating cover-
age of new categories of benefi-
ciaries (e.g., low-income pregnant 
women in 1988) and dramatically 
expanding coverage for others 
(e.g., low-income children in 1989). 
Indeed, the Social Security Act has 
always reserved to Congress “the 
right to alter, amend, or repeal any 
provision” of the Medicaid stat-
ute.2 The ACA’s expansion of Med-
icaid to cover all nonelderly low-
income persons with household 
incomes below 138% of the fed-
eral poverty level was the latest in 
a long line of evolutionary pro-
gram reforms.
The 26 state challengers 
claimed that the ACA Medicaid 
amendments crossed a constitu-
tional line. It is clear that Con-
gress cannot force states to par-
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ticipate in a federal program. The 
Court has long recognized, how-
ever, that the federal government 
can offer funding to the states 
conditional on their satisfying 
program requirements. The Court 
had speculated in earlier cases 
that a situation could arise in 
which “the financial inducement 
offered by Congress” was so coer-
cive that “pressure turns into com-
pulsion.” But no federal court had 
ever held that a federal law failed 
this test, and the lower courts re-
jected the states’ Medicaid claims.
Chief Justice John Roberts, 
joined by Justices Stephen Breyer 
and Elena Kagan and supported 
by a joint dissent from Justices 
Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kenne-
dy, Clarence Thomas, and Samu-
el Alito, held that the ACA Med-
icaid expansion crossed this line. 
The Court claimed, moreover, 
that this “coercion” doctrine is 
fundamental to federalism and 
that brandishing federal funding 
to coerce states to participate in 
federal programs threatens the 
states’ independent sovereignty.
Because the Medicaid expan-
sion was established as a man-
date, not an option, Medicaid law 
would allow the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) 
to threaten to withhold all Med-
icaid payments from states not 
adopting it — a penalty that HHS 
has never imposed. In this case, 
however, the Court held that such 
a response was impermissible. 
Withdrawal of program funding 
would amount to unconstitutional 
coercion, given the program’s size 
and the nature of the expansion. 
On average, Medicaid accounts 
for more than 20% of total state 
budgets and represents the larg-
est single source of federal fund-
ing to the states. Furthermore, 
said Roberts, the ACA Medicaid 
expansion changed Medicaid fun-
damentally. Medicaid, he claimed, 
“is no longer a program to care 
for the neediest among us, but 
rather an element of a compre-
hensive national plan to provide 
universal health insurance cover-
age.” Congress could not consti-
tutionally force the states to im-
plement a new program under the 
threat of losing existing program 
funding.
Having found the Medicaid ex-
pansion unconstitutional, however, 
the Court did not strike the expan-
sion, as the dissenters wanted. In-
stead, it simply prevented HHS 
from enforcing the expansion as a 
mandate. The practical effect is to 
turn it into an option, although 
the law remains on the books 
unchanged. At the same time, 
the Court made clear that Con-
gress has the power to delineate 
the con ditions under which the 
states can receive new expansion 
funding.
The Court’s decision raises 
three key questions. First, which 
ACA Medicaid reforms are affect-
ed? The ACA makes many changes 
in the Medicaid program. In par-
ticular, the law contains a main-
tenance-of-effort provision barring 
states from rolling back Medicaid 
coverage until their health insur-
ance exchanges are operational. 
It also requires other changes in 
coverage and enrollment. The 
states challenged ACA reforms 
beyond the expansion of eligibil-
ity, including the maintenance-of-
effort requirement.3 But Roberts’s 
opinion focuses only on the ex-
pansion group, never mentioning 
the other reforms; presumably the 
Court considered them part of 
the existing program, subject to 
the program’s normal enforcement 
tool for mandatory provisions. A 
July 10 letter from HHS Secretary 
Kathleen Sebelius makes clear 
that where Medicaid is concerned, 
the Roberts ruling is confined to 
newly eligible adults.4
Second, how far does the 
Court’s new coercion doctrine go? 
The federal government condi-
tions participation in many coop-
erative programs on state compli-
ance with federal requirements. 
These joint efforts include not 
just health and social welfare 
programs but education, environ-
mental, civil rights, and transpor-
tation programs. Are they all at 
risk of litigation? Have states 
now been given a vested right in 
the status quo? Roberts seemed 
particularly focused on the no-
tion that the Medicaid expan-
sion changes the program in 
“kind,” not merely “degree,” and 
on Medicaid’s size. How big is 
big? Can a federal program be 
too big to change? And when 
does a program change in kind 
and not degree? It is hard to find 
limiting principles of the Court’s 
holding.
Finally, how will the states re-
spond? Several Republican gover-
nors have made a show of their 
adamant refusal to expand their 
Medicaid programs. But the Med-
icaid expansions are accompanied 
by 100% federal funding for the 
first 3 years, phasing down to 
90% by 2020. The ACA offers no 
other means for covering adults 
with incomes below 100% of the 
poverty level. Resisting states ef-
fectively intensify the huge un-
compensated care burden faced 
by their hospitals, deprive other 
health care industry players of 
important revenues, and keep 
their medically underserved com-
munities from receiving an enor-
mous economic infusion. Indeed, 
there is good evidence that over-
all, the changes in Medicaid will 
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save, rather than cost, money.5 
And residents of states that do 
not expand will still be paying 
federal taxes to cover the expan-
sion in states that do expand.
Given the clear language of the 
Court’s decision, the July 10 letter 
permits states to decide whether 
to accept funding to support the 
Medicaid expansion for newly eli-
gible adults as a group or to re-
ject it and with it hundreds of 
billions of dollars in much-needed 
federal assistance. But some states 
may press the administration to 
interpret the expansion as a sim-
ple state option, allowing them to 
cover some portion of the expan-
sion group and not others. This 
approach has no support in the 
law and would invite states to leave 
the most vulnerable members of 
the expansion group — adults 
without children — exposed to 
the worst sort of discriminatory 
exclusion. The administration may 
be pressured to enter into nego-
tiations with each state, using its 
waiver authority. The ACA spe-
cifically amended the Medicaid 
waiver process to ensure that it 
was used for genuine research, 
not political horse trading. One 
can only hope that the states will 
come to their senses and we all 
will be spared the spectacle of 
federal and state governments 
struggling over the lives and 
health of the poorest among us.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors 
are available with the full text of this article 
at NEJM.org.
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Tattoo Ink–Related Infections — Awareness, Diagnosis, 
Reporting, and Prevention
Pamela M. LeBlanc, M.P.H., Katherine A. Hollinger, D.V.M., M.P.H., and Karl C. Klontz, M.D., M.P.H.
Related article, p. 1020
Tattoos have become increas-ingly popular in recent 
years. In the United States, the 
estimated percentage of adults 
with one or more tattoos in-
creased from 14% in 2008 to 
21% in 2012.1 The process of 
tattooing exposes the recipient 
to risks of infections with vari-
ous pathogens, some of which 
are serious and difficult to treat. 
Historically, the control of tat-
too-associated dermatologic in-
fections has focused on ensuring 
safe tattooing practices and pre-
venting contamination of ink at 
the tattoo parlors — a regulatory 
task overseen by state and local 
authorities.2 In recent months, 
however, reported outbreaks of 
nontuberculous mycobacterial in-
fections associated with contami-
nated tattoo ink have raised 
questions about the adequacy of 
prevention efforts implemented at 
the tattoo-parlor level alone. The 
Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) is reaching out to health 
care providers, public health offi-
cials, consumers, and the tattoo 
industry to improve awareness, di-
agnosis, and reporting (through 
the MedWatch program) in order 
to develop more effective mea-
sures for tattoo ink–related public 
health problems.
In late January 2012, the FDA 
was notified, through MedWatch 
adverse-event reports,3 of a clus-
ter of patients in New York who 
had contracted nontuberculous 
mycobacterial infections manifest-
ed by red papules on the gray-col-
ored areas of recently acquired 
tattoos (see photo and the article 
by Kennedy and colleagues in 
this issue of the Journal, pages 
1020–1024). The FDA collaborat-
ed with local and state health 
departments and the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention to 
investigate the outbreak. Efforts 
to identify additional cases na-
tionwide revealed that there were 
other outbreaks of tattoo ink–
related nontuberculous mycobac-
terial infection that were associ-
ated with multiple brands of 
ink, occurred in other states, 
and involved multiple species of 
mycobacteria (e.g., chelonae, for-
tuitum, and abscessus).
Previously published reports of 
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